MillerKnoll (MLKN) is a mid-sized commercial and residential furniture company that emerged from Herman Miller's 2021 acquisition of Knoll and has spent the years since digesting that deal. The headline story is one of gradual recovery: after revenue peaked above $4 billion in fiscal 2023 and margins were squeezed by integration costs and a softer office-furniture market, the most recent fiscal year (ending May 2026) shows meaningful stabilization — revenue edged back up to $3.84 billion, gross margins recovered to nearly 39%, and the company swung back to modest net profitability. Critically, the balance sheet has been dramatically repaired; debt-to-equity collapsed from nearly 1x in fiscal 2022–2023 to a negligible 0.02x by fiscal year-end 2026, removing a key overhang. Capital spending is moderate and rising slowly, consistent with a business investing in capacity without overextending. The 5-year revenue CAGR looks healthy at about 9.3%, though that figure is heavily influenced by the Knoll acquisition doubling the company's revenue base — the more telling 3-year CAGR is a slight decline of about 2%, reflecting the post-merger revenue contraction. Overall, MillerKnoll looks financially healthier today than it has since the merger, but top-line growth remains the central challenge to watch.
Snapshot & Big Picture
MillerKnoll was created in 2021 when Herman Miller — a storied American office-furniture brand with roots going back nearly a century — acquired Knoll, another design-forward furniture institution. The combined entity operates across contract (commercial office) and retail channels under multiple brands. The merger nearly doubled revenue overnight, but also loaded the balance sheet with debt and created significant integration complexity. The fiscal years from 2022 through 2024 were marked by margin pressure, net losses in two of those years, and a declining revenue trend from the post-merger peak. Fiscal 2026 (ending May 30, 2026) represents the clearest evidence yet that the company has turned a corner operationally.
| Fiscal Year End | Revenue | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | Net Margin | Debt-to-Equity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 2017 | $2.28B | 37.9% | 8.4% | 5.4% | 0.34x |
| Jun 2018 | $2.38B | 36.7% | 7.5% | 5.4% | 0.41x |
| Jun 2019 | $2.57B | 36.2% | 7.9% | 6.3% | 0.40x |
| May 2020 | $2.49B | 36.6% | -1.5% | -0.3% | 0.91x |
| May 2021 | $2.47B | 38.6% | 9.4% | 7.1% | 0.32x |
| May 2022 | $3.95B | 34.3% | 1.0% | -0.7% | 0.99x |
| Jun 2023 | $4.09B | 35.0% | 3.0% | 1.0% | 0.98x |
| Jun 2024 | $3.63B | 39.1% | 4.6% | 2.3% | 0.03x |
| May 2025 | $3.67B | 38.8% | 1.4% | -1.0% | 0.01x |
| May 2026 | $3.84B | 38.8% | 5.2% | 2.4% | 0.02x |
Latest Quarter Snapshot
The most recent quarterly data (period ending May 30, 2026, as reported in the latest 10-Q filed March 30, 2026) is the freshest read on MillerKnoll's operations and reflects conditions more current than the annual figures above. Note that because the quarterly period end date matches the fiscal year end date of May 30, 2026, this quarter represents the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026.
| Metric | Q4 FY2026 (Period End May 30, 2026) |
|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.00B |
| EBITDA | $89.6M |
| Gross Margin | 39.4% |
| Operating Margin | 5.1% |
| Net Margin | 2.4% |
| Current Ratio | 1.58x |
| Debt-to-Equity | 0.17x |
| Capital Expenditures | $38.9M |
| CapEx-to-Revenue | 3.9% |
The quarterly picture reinforces the annual trend: gross margins are at their strongest level in years at 39.4%, operating and net margins are both solidly positive, and liquidity (current ratio of 1.58x) is comfortable. The quarterly debt-to-equity of 0.17x is slightly higher than the annual figure, which can reflect normal within-year fluctuations in working capital and short-term obligations, but it remains very low in absolute terms. CapEx at 3.9% of revenue in the quarter is running slightly above the full-year rate, worth monitoring but not yet a concern.
Profitability
Profitability trends at MillerKnoll tell a tale of two eras: a lean, well-run Herman Miller before the merger, and a more turbulent combined entity struggling to integrate. Pre-merger (fiscal 2017–2021), the legacy Herman Miller business consistently delivered operating margins of 7–9% and net margins of 5–7%. The Knoll acquisition brought scale but also crushed margins: fiscal 2022 saw an operating margin of just 1% and a net loss, with gross margins falling to 34% as integration costs, supply chain disruptions, and pricing headwinds hit simultaneously.
The recovery since then has been uneven but ultimately positive. Gross margins have made the strongest comeback, rising from a trough of ~34% in fiscal 2022–2023 to ~39% in fiscal 2024–2026, effectively recovering to pre-merger levels. This suggests the company has successfully repriced contracts, rationalized its product mix, and captured some cost synergies on the manufacturing side. Operating margins remain below pre-merger peaks — 5.2% in fiscal 2026 versus 8–9% historically — indicating that overhead and SG&A costs have not yet been fully optimized. Fiscal 2025 was a notable stumble, with operating margin falling back to 1.4% and the company posting a small net loss (-1.0% net margin), underscoring that the recovery path is not linear. The bounce-back in fiscal 2026 to 5.2% operating margin and 2.4% net margin is therefore genuinely encouraging.
| Fiscal Year End | EBITDA | Operating Margin | Net Margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| May 2021 | $319.7M | 9.4% | 7.1% |
| May 2022 | $230.4M | 1.0% | -0.7% |
| Jun 2023 | $277.4M | 3.0% | 1.0% |
| Jun 2024 | $322.3M | 4.6% | 2.3% |
| May 2025 | $191.0M | 1.4% | -1.0% |
| May 2026 | $346.6M | 5.2% | 2.4% |
EBITDA tells a similar story: $346.6M in fiscal 2026 is the highest in the post-merger dataset and compares favorably even to the pre-merger $319.7M in fiscal 2021 — though the business is now nearly 60% larger by revenue, so the EBITDA margin implied is actually lower. Getting EBITDA margins back to pre-merger levels of roughly 13% (versus today's ~9%) would require either meaningful revenue growth or further cost reduction, and likely both.
Financial Health
The single most dramatic improvement in MillerKnoll's financials over the past two years has been on the balance sheet. Debt-to-equity stood at approximately 0.98–0.99x in fiscal 2022 and 2023 — near parity between debt and equity — which was a direct consequence of the leveraged Knoll acquisition. By fiscal year-end 2024, that ratio had plummeted to 0.03x, and it remained essentially negligible at 0.02x in fiscal 2026. This deleveraging is a significant de-risking event: the company is no longer meaningfully constrained by its debt load, interest expense pressure is reduced, and financial flexibility for future investments or returns to shareholders has been restored.
Liquidity, as measured by the current ratio, has been consistently healthy throughout the period, ranging from 1.28x to 1.95x. The current ratio of 1.58x in fiscal 2026 (and matching the latest quarterly figure) indicates the company can comfortably cover its near-term obligations. There is no signs of liquidity stress.
Capital Expenditures
Capital intensity at MillerKnoll is moderate and has been relatively stable, with CapEx running between roughly 2% and 3.8% of revenue across the decade of data available. This is consistent with a business that is asset-light relative to heavy manufacturing industries — furniture design and assembly does not require the same level of ongoing reinvestment as, say, semiconductor fabrication.
| Fiscal Year End | Capital Expenditures | CapEx-to-Revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Jun 2017 | $87.3M | 3.8% |
| Jun 2018 | $70.6M | 3.0% |
| Jun 2019 | $85.8M | 3.3% |
| May 2020 | $69.0M | 2.8% |
| May 2021 | $59.8M | 2.4% |
| May 2022 | $94.7M | 2.4% |
| Jun 2023 | $83.3M | 2.0% |
| Jun 2024 | $78.4M | 2.2% |
| May 2025 | $107.6M | 2.9% |
| May 2026 | $122.3M | 3.2% |
| Q4 FY2026 (Quarterly) | $38.9M | 3.9% |
The uptick in CapEx in fiscal 2025 ($107.6M) and 2026 ($122.3M) — and the elevated quarterly rate of 3.9% — suggests the company is investing more actively now that the balance sheet is clean. This could reflect showroom refreshes, manufacturing upgrades, or technology investments. At current levels, CapEx remains well within a range that free cash flow can comfortably support, and it does not signal an aggressive or risky capital program.
Growth
Revenue growth at MillerKnoll is heavily shaped by the transformative 2021 Knoll acquisition, which makes multi-year CAGR figures require careful interpretation.
| Window | Start Fiscal Year | End Fiscal Year | Start Revenue | End Revenue | CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3-Year | Jun 2023 | May 2026 | $4.09B | $3.84B | -2.0% |
| 5-Year | May 2021 | May 2026 | $2.47B | $3.84B | +9.3% |
| 10-Year | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Not available |
The 10-year CAGR is not available because the SEC filing history used in this analysis does not extend back a full decade to a comparable starting point. The 5-year CAGR of 9.3% looks impressive on the surface but is almost entirely a product of the Knoll acquisition in fiscal 2022 — organic growth has been minimal or slightly negative in the years since. The 3-year CAGR of -2.0%, spanning fiscal 2023 to fiscal 2026, is the more honest measure of recent organic trajectory: revenue has contracted modestly from the post-merger peak as the office-furniture market digested a post-pandemic normalization. The critical question for investors is whether fiscal 2026's revenue uptick to $3.84B (from $3.67B in fiscal 2025) marks the beginning of a genuine top-line recovery, or whether it represents a temporary fluctuation in a still-soft demand environment.

Leave a Comment